Abstract-State estimation is a fundamental process needed for the effective operation of the smart grid. As such, cyber-physical attacks such as denial-of-service and data injection attacks, which often target the availability and the integrity of the collected state estimation measurements, can have detrimental consequences on the operation of the system. In this paper, a novel graph-theoretic framework is proposed to generalize the analysis of a broad set of security attacks, including observability and data injection attacks, that target the state estimator of a smart grid. First, the notion of observability attacks -denial-of-service attacks on measurement units which render the system unobservable -is defined based on a proposed graph-theoretic construct. In this respect, an algorithm is proposed to characterize the critical set of measurements which must be removed along with a certain measurement to make the system unobservable. It is then shown that, for the system to be observable, these critical sets must be part of a maximum matching over a proposed bipartite graph. In addition, it is shown that stealthy data injection attacks are a special case of these observability attacks. Then, various attack strategies and defense policies, for observability and data injection attacks, are shown to be amenable to analysis using variations of the formulated maximum-matching problem over a bipartite graph. The proposed framework is then shown to provide a unified basis for exact analysis of four key security problems (among others), pertaining to the characterization of: 1) The sparsest stealthy attack, 2) The sparsest stealthy attack including a certain specific measurement, 3) A set of measurements which must be defended to thwart all potential stealthy attacks, and 4) The set of measurements, which when protected, can thwart any attack whose cardinality is below a certain threshold. A case study using the IEEE 14-bus system containing a set of 17 distributed measurement units is used to corroborate the theoretical findings. In this case analysis, stealthy attacks of lowest cardinality are characterized and shown to have a cardinality equal to 2. In addition, it is shown, for example, that defending only 3 out of the 17 measurements is enough to thwart any stealthy attack with cardinality lower than 3, while defending a minimum of 13 measurements is needed to thwart all possible stealthy attacks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the integration of information and communication technologies in power systems, new security concerns have emerged due to the potential exploitation of this cyber layer to infiltrate and compromise the underlying physical system [1] , [2] . Indeed, in recent years, various studies have focused on analyzing the security of emerging cyber-physical power systems [1] - [14] and the effect of potential cyber attacks on the various operational components of the grid, ranging from power system state estimation [4] , [5] , to electricity markets [6] - [8] , power system protection [9] , [10] , and power system dynamics and control [9] , [11] - [14] . Such attacks can become more pronounced when they target critical power system functions such as state estimation. In this regard, the power system state estimation is an integral smart grid process in which system-wide measurements are collected and processed to estimate the global state of operation of a power system [15] . State estimation is the basis for various grid operational decisions such as congestion management, economic dispatch, contingency analysis, and electricity pricing [16] . As a result, the critical importance of state estimation to the sustainable operation of the grid makes it a primary target of possible cyberphysical attacks [1] , [2] . Such attacks may target the availability of the collected measurements as well as their integrity.
In this respect, intercepting a subset of the collected measurement data using availability attacks (such as denial-of-service attacks) can render the power system unobservable (i.e. not fully observable), a state in which the collected measurements do not provide enough independent equations to estimate the states. Such cyber-physical attacks, to which we refer as observability attacks hereinafter, will make the operator partially oblivious to the real state of operation of the system, leading to uninformed operational decisions. Beyond observability attacks, data injection attacks (DIAs) have emerged as a malicious type of integrity attacks which aim at manipulating the collected state estimation data, leading to inaccurate state estimation outcomes that result in misinformed operational decisions with potentially detrimental consequences [1] , [4] , [6] . As shown in [4] , such DIAs can stealthily target the power system state estimation process -manipulating the collected measurements and altering the state estimation outcome -while being undetectable by the system operator using traditional bad data detection mechanisms. Hence, due to their potential danger to system operation, such stealthy data injection attacks (SDIAs) and observability attacks have been the focus of various recent research efforts [17] - [23] .
A. Related Works
In this regard, the works in [17] and [18] focused on computing a security set which comprises the minimum set of measurements which must be attacked in addition to a certain specific measurement in order to make the system unobservable. Moreover, the work in [19] focused on computing the cardinality of the smallest set of meters which when attacked render the system unobservable. The authors in [20] - [22] extended such observability problems to studying SDIAs. In this regard, these works focused on characterizing the sparsest stealthy attack containing a certain specific measurement. In addition, the work in [23] focused on characterizing a set of measurements to defend so that no attack which concurrently manipulates a set of meters whose cardinality is below a certain threshold can be stealthy. Hence, this latter analysis focuses on the defense against resource-limited attackers. As such, these works have focused on formulating and studying mathematical problems whose solutions enable anticipating potential sophisticated attacks -which constitutes a first step towards deriving corresponding defense mechanisms -and designing optimal defense strategies to thwart such attacks and mitigate their potential effect.
The computational complexity of these problems [17] - [23] has led to limiting the analysis of their solutions to special, often approximated, cases or required the use of heuristics and relaxation techniques which led to suboptimal solutions. For example, for characterizing the sparsest observability attacks containing a specific measurement, the work in [17] focused on the special case of measurement sets of low cardinality while the work in [18] derived an approximate solution that is based on the solution of a min-cut problem. In addition, with regard to the analysis of the sparsest SDIAs containing a certain measurement [20] - [22] , the work in [20] focused on deriving an upper-bound on this stealthy attack set while the work in [21] used min-cut relaxation techniques to approximate the sought solution. Moreover, the work in [22] proposed a heuristic algorithm which can approximate the solution of the studied problem while an exact solution was found for the special case in which power flows over all the transmission lines and power injections into and out of every bus are assumed to be measured. To defend against a resource-limited data injection attacker, the authors in [23] used an l 1 relaxation method for characterizing the set of meters to defend to thwart SDIAs launched by attackers whose attack space is limited by a certain cardinality threshold. Other related security works are also found in [24] - [29] .
Therefore, this rich body of literature [17] - [29] employs heuristics and approximation techniques to numerically approximate the solutions to these fundamental observability attacks and SDIA problems rather than analytically characterizing their solutions. As such, there is a need for an analytical framework which allows modeling and studying such data availability and integrity attacks and enables an analytical characterization of mathematical solutions to such widely-studied security problems. In addition, the fact that these works [17] - [23] studied correlated problems but from different perspectives highlights the need for a unified framework using which solutions to such correlated observability attacks and SDIA problems can be studied and derived.
B. Contributions
The main contribution of this paper is a novel unified graphtheoretic framework that enables a global detailed modeling and understanding of observability attacks and SDIAs. As a result, this framework provides a unified tool for analyzing various widely-studied observability attacks and SDIA problems such as those studied in [17] - [23] , among others. In addition, the proposed framework enables the characterization of exact analytical solutions to such security problems, instead of relying on numerical approximations or heuristics. This will enable a fundamental analysis and modeling of potential attack strategies and the derivation of defense strategies which can thwart and mitigate the effect of such observability attacks and SDIAs. In this regard, our proposed framework is based on a shift in the modeling of observability attacks and SDIAs from a linear algebra frame of reference to a graph-theoretic perspective. As a result, based on this proposed framework, such attacks can be modeled and analyzed by requiring only power system topological data, namely, the power system 1-line diagram and the location of deployed measurement units without the need for neither line parameters data nor the exact knowledge of power flow levels throughout the system.
To build the proposed framework, we first begin by introducing a graph-theoretic basis of observability attacks and, then, we prove that SDIAs are a special case of such observability attacks. In this respect, we introduce an algorithm providing a step-bystep approach for building critical sets, a set of measurements -containing a certain specific measurement -which, when removed, render the system unobservable. We then prove that for a DIA to be stealthy, the attacked measurements should strictly result in leaving critical sets unmatched as part of a maximum matching over an introduced bipartite graph. As such, a graphtheoretic model of SDIAs is then introduced based on which the solutions to various well-studied SDIA problems are analytically characterized. In particular, we show that our developed framework can be readily applied to derive analytical solutions to various SDIA problems such as, but not limited to: 1) Finding the stealthy attack of lowest cardinality, 2) Finding the stealthy attack of lowest cardinality, including a specific measurement, 3) Finding a set of measurements which when defended can thwart all possible stealthy attacks, and 4) Finding a set of measurements to defend against a resource-limited attacker, among others. A case study using the IEEE 14-bus system, with 17 distributed measurement units, is considered throughout the paper to showcase the developed analytical concepts. In this case study, we characterize the sparsest SDIAs which can successfully target the system and show that the cardinality of such attacks is equal to 2. In addition, the performed case analysis on the IEEE 14-bus system shows that defending a characterized set of 13 (out of 17) measurements is necessary to prevent any successful SDIAs, while defending only 3 measurements is enough to thwart any stealthy attack of cardinality lower than 3. This, hence, enables the defender to build on some acquired knowledge regarding the resources of the adversaries to derive a corresponding defense strategy.
In this respect, the derived analytical results and presented case study showcase the importance of the proposed framework for studying various correlated observability attacks and SDIA problems and pave the way for further analyzing additional emerging problems in that field.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces state estimation and power system observability. Section III introduces our proposed graph-theoretic foundation of observability attacks and shows its impact on modeling and analyzing such data availability attacks. Section IV introduces the proposed graph-theoretic framework for modeling SDIAs, as well as studies and solves various well-studied SDIA problems. Section V concludes the paper and provides an outlook detailing the impact of the proposed framework on studying future observability and data injection attacks.
II. STATE ESTIMATION AND OBSERVABILITY
We next provide an overview of state estimation and of the algebraic and topological concepts of observability in power systems. This overview provides background material which is useful for the analysis that follows.
A. State Estimation Process
Consider a power system state estimation process which uses various measurements collected from across the system to estimate the voltage magnitudes and phase angles at every bus in the system, known as the system states [15] . Let z ∈ R m (m being the number of measurements) be the vector of collected measurements, which includes power flow levels (real and reactive) over transmission lines, power (real and reactive) injected in or withdrawn from certain buses, as well as bus voltage magnitudes. In addition, let x ∈ R n be the vector of system states. The relationship between the measurements and the states directly follows from the linearized power flow equations [15] :
where H ∈ R m×n is the measurement Jacobian matrix and e ∈ R m is the vector of random errors that typically follows a Gaussian distribution, N (0, R), where R is positive definite. Here m ≥ n, that is the dimension of x cannot be larger than the dimension of the measurement vector, z. Further, we assume that H is a full-rank matrix. Using a maximum-likelihood estimator -a weighted least squares estimator (WLS) for a Gaussian error vector e -an estimate of the states,x, will be:
This estimate of all the states provides visibility of the steadystate operating conditions of the system, based on which various operational decisions are performed [15] .
B. Power System Observability
The observability of the power system consists of the ability to uniquely determine its states based on the collected set of measurements [15] . Observability, hence, requires the collected measurements to provide enough independent equations to allow the estimation of the state vector, x. In this respect, the power system is observable 1 if and only if the measurement matrix H is of full column rank [15] , which was our initial assumption. This is known as algebraic observability. Due to the P − θ, Q − V decoupling 2 in power systems [16] , the observability analysis can be decoupled by separately studying the observability of voltage phase angles, using real power measurements, and the observability of voltage magnitudes, based on reactive power measurements. Since the two analyses are identical, we focus here on phase angle observability. To this end, we consider z ∈ R m to be a vector of real power measurements (bus injections and line flows), and the state vector x ∈ [−π, π] n to be the vector of voltage phase angles (in radians). Here, n = N − 1 for a power system with N buses given that the phase angle of the reference bus is fixed and is taken to be the reference with respect to which all other phase angles are calculated [15] .
An alternative measure of observability, which is equivalent to algebraic observability, is proposed in [30] and uses graphtheoretic techniques to introduce the concept of topological observability. In this regard, let the power system 1-line diagram be represented as a graph G(N , L) in which the set of vertices N , |N | = N , represents the set of buses of the power system while the set of branches L, |L| = L, represents the set of lines. One key result that was shown in [30] and that will be of relevance to our work is the following:
Remark 1: A power system is observable if and only if the set of measurements can be assigned to the edges of the power system graph, following a set of assignment rules, in a way to form a spanning tree over this graph.
In this respect, let M be the set of measurements and let f (.): M → L be an assignment function defined as follows.
Definition 1: f (.): M → L is a measurement assignment function which assigns measurements in M to lines in L following a set of assignment rules defined as [30] :
. In other words, a measurement cannot be simultaneously assigned to two different lines. 2) If m is a measurement over a transmission line l, then m can only be assigned to l. 3) If m is an injection measurement over bus η ∈ N , then m can only be assigned to an unmeasured line l that is incident to η. If such a measurement assignment that yields a spanning tree over the power network G can be found, the power system will be observable (and vice versa). Fig. 1 shows an example of measurement assignments over the IEEE 14-bus system. This figure shows the tree branches (marked in solid red lines) to which measurement where assigned as part of the measurement assignment function. The measurements that were assigned to each one of these branches are identified using dashed arrow lines originating from the assigned measurement and pointing to the line to which this measurement is assigned. This tree is formed of branches {1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19} and spans the whole vertex set N of the power system graph G, and hence, is a spanning tree. As a result, since this measurement assignment yields a spanning tree, then the available set of measurements renders the system observable.
Various algorithms of low complexity have been proposed to find and build such a spanning tree [30] - [32] . In this regard, the work in [30] proposes an algorithm to find a spanning tree over G, which will be used in some of the derivations in the following sections. This algorithm starts by processing flow measurements by assigning each flow measurement to its corresponding branch to form disjoint tree components. Then, injection measurements are assigned to lines in a way to connect these tree components to form one spanning tree. Here, we highlight one type of injection measurements, namely, boundary injections, which will play a crucial role in our derivations.
Definition 2: A boundary injection is an injection measurement over a bus incident to lines whose flow is measured and lines whose flow is not measured [30] . Boundary injections play a major role in connecting these tree components. Indeed, for a bus which is not incident to a measured line to be connected to the spanning tree, it has to be reachable from a boundary injection through a series of measurement assignments [30] . As such, boundary injections are considered to be sources and unmeasured buses are considered to be sinks which must be connected to these sources following the set of measurement assignment rules.
We next build on the foundation of topological observability to present a graph-theoretic framework for modeling and studying the security of the smart grid facing observability attacks and SDIAs. This framework is based on our proposed concepts of critical sets and observability sets, which we define and derive in the next section.
III. OBSERVABILITY ATTACKS
The sustainable and efficient operation of the power system requires an accurate observability of all its states [15] . Security attacks that target this observability can cause a limited (or partial) monitoring ability for the operator over the power system which can lead to incorrect operational decisions. Hence, studying and modeling attacks which can target the full observability of the system is indispensable for the sustainable operation of the grid. In this respect, we define a cyber-physical attack, dubbed observability attack, that consists of launching a denialof-service (DoS) attack against a set of measurements to make the system unobservable. We next study this type of attacks by introducing and characterizing what we define as critical sets and observability sets and prove that the well-studied stealthy data injection attack is a subset of our defined observability attacks. This latter finding will provide us with a unified set of tools to solve various widely-studied SDIA problems.
A. Critical Sets
Understanding and modeling observability attacks requires an in-depth understanding of the effect of the loss of any bundle of measurements on the observability of the system. In this regard, we next introduce a structured method for identifying, for each measurement m, the set of additional measurements including m (denoted as the critical set of m), which when removed renders the system unobservable. To this end, we first characterize the set of potential measurements to be investigated, for each measurement m, and then provide the necessary discussion and introduce the underlying method for characterizing the critical set of m. In this process, we prove that characterizing such a critical set is at most as complex as solving a maximum matching problem over a bipartite graph. Then, a detailed algorithm is introduced to provide a step-by-step method for characterizing such critical sets.
Let M C ⊆ M be the set of measurements which are part of the assignment function, i.e., the measurements assigned to form a spanning tree over the power network. We refer to measurements not part of M C as unassigned measurements. Such unassigned measurements are, hence, by definition redundant measurements. We consider that the system is originally observable. Hence, such a spanning tree and its corresponding set of assigned measurements exist. We also let T (N , B) be the spanning tree whose set of branches are captured by the set B ⊆ L. B, in essence, represents the set of lines to which measurements were assigned as part of the assignment function f (.). For example, as previously mentioned, in Fig. 1 , the branches of the spanning tree are represented in solid red lines.
Consider an assigned measurement m ∈ M C . Since m is assigned, its removal will split the tree T into two spanning trees T Fig. 1 and will be used throughout this work to provide a practical example of the defined concepts and analytical derivations.
To investigate observability, we define a set of measurements for each measurement m ∈ M C , which we refer as the critical set of m and we denote by C m , as follows: Definition 3: For a measurement m ∈ M C , the critical set of m, denoted as C m ⊆ M, is a set of measurements which can be used to reconnect T 
We next introduce the set of rules that should be followed to build the critical set of a certain measurement, following which, we provide a structured algorithm for building such critical sets.
Based on the measurement assignment rules described in Section II-B, a necessary condition for a measurement m to be in C m is for it to be either a line flow measurement over a line l ∈ L m or an injection measurement over a bus η ∈ {N 
and is a redundant measurement since it was not assigned to any line as part of the original tree T . Hence, when F 2 is removed, I 4 can be assigned to line 7 to reconnect T without causing any disconnection in T F2 2 , in which it is located. Hence, I 4 ∈ C F2 . 3 Given that m is always considered to be part of its critical set C m , m is always added to C m after investigating the measurements in M m . 4 Such measurements are unassigned measurements. In fact, if m is a line measurement, lines in L m would form a loop with f (m) and hence cannot be part of the original spanning tree. Moreover, if m is an injection measurement, M m F would be an empty set since, otherwise, based on the spanning tree building method described in Section II-B and originally presented in [30] , one of the measurements in M m F would have been assigned to a line in L m , and m would not have been part of M C . As a result, measurements in M m F are redundant. will be reconnected, but since m was originally assigned as part of the original tree, another portion of the tree gets disconnected by this reassignment of m to l instead of l . Hence, m can be part of C m if another measurement can be used to reconnect the subgraph which was disconnected by the reassignment of m from l to l. For example, consider the injection measurement over bus 13 in Fig. 2 , which we denote by I 13 . I 13 has been assigned to line 12 as part of the original spanning tree. Hence, if I 13 is assigned to line 20 to reconnect T after measurement F 2 is removed, it cannot be assigned to line 12 anymore which will split T F2 1 into two subtrees, one formed by buses {12, 13} and line 19 and the other subtree composed of buses {6, 10, 1, 5} and lines {13, 10, 1}. We denote these two subtrees as T 1,2 , then I 13 can be assigned to line 20 and, hence, should be part of C F2 . To this end, consider the injection measurement over bus 12, denoted by I 12 , which was not part of the original spanning tree assignment. I 12 can be assigned to line 11 to reconnect T 1,2 in case I 13 is reassigned to line 20 instead of line 12. Hence, I 13 is indeed redundant, resulting in I 13 ∈ C F2 . To generalize the analysis in this example, we next provide a general discussion of measurements in M m ∩M C (i.e., the third category of measurements in M m , shown in Fig. 3 ) which allows determining whether a measurement in this set is part of C m .
More generally, consider m ∈ M m ∩ M C to be a measurement assigned to a branch l = f (m ) in T As discussed in Section II-B, two subtrees can be interconnected by using a measurement assignment if the processing of an unassigned boundary injection in one of them reaches a node in the other. We denote such unassigned boundary injections as backup boundary injections, which we formally define as follows: Since the algorithm in [30] is based on connecting subtreesto build a full spanning tree -by starting from an unassigned boundary injection in a certain subtree (as a source) to reach a node in another subtree (as a sink), this algorithm can be employed to locate a backup boundary injection for a measurement m ∈ M m ∩ M C . To this end, to find a backup boundary injection of m , we run the algorithm in [30] by starting from an unassigned boundary injection in either T of them can be in C m , concurrently. As a result, due to this one-to-one assignment requirement between backup boundary injections and injection measurements in M m ∩M C , finding this assignment can be performed by solving a maximum matching problem over a bipartite graph 5 , as the one shown in Fig. 4 . We refer to this graph as the injection measurements -backup boundary injections bipartite graph.
In this bipartite graph, the left-side nodes denote the injection measurements in M m ∩ M C and right-side nodes denote the union of their backup boundary injections, Here, we note that a boundary injection can be simultaneously part of different backup boundary injection sets. Hence, finding the injection measurements in M m ∩ M C which are part of the critical set of m, C m , is equivalent to solving a maximum matching problem over this bipartite graph, which is a problem whose exact solution can be obtained efficiently in polynomial time 6 . As a result, the matched left-side nodes in this maximum matching over the injection measurements -backup boundary injections bipartite graph are the injection measurements in M m ∩ M C which will be part of the critical set of m, C m . Based on these introduced rules for building critical sets, Algorithm 1 provides a structured step-by-step method for building the critical set, C m , for each measurement m ∈ M C .
B. Example and Case Analysis
As an example of characterizing the critical sets of the various measurements in a power system, we consider the IEEE 14-bus system in Fig. 1 . In this example, we refer to an injection measurement over bus k as I k and a flow measurement over line k as F k . We first consider the measurement over line 2, F 2 , for which we find the critical set C F2 using Algorithm 1. From Fig. 2 , we can see that removing F 2 will result in splitting the original spanning tree into two trees, T Solve maximum matching over the injection measurements -backup boundary injections bipartite graph 21 :
if m is a matched node as part of the maximum matching then
23:
Add m to C will disconnect bus 2 from the rest of T 2 that is not part of M F2 is I 7 . However, using the algorithm in [30, Fig. 1 ], we can observe that starting from I 7 , the algorithm does not reach bus 2. Hence, bus 2 cannot be reconnected to the rest of T F2 2 using any unassigned boundary injections over buses in G Similarly, Algorithm 1 can be carried out to characterize the critical sets of all of the measurements in M C in the IEEE 14-bus system in Fig.1 . The results are listed in Table I .
We next discuss the value of critical sets with regard to understanding and analyzing observability attacks. We also introduce the concept of observability sets, a generalization of critical sets, which provides a holistic modeling of observability attacks.
Notation: We use the following notation in the derivations that ensue. For the Jacobian matrix H, we let H (−K)+(K ) 8 If I 1 or I 5 are to be reassigned to lines 2 or 3, respectively, to reconnect T into two subtrees which cannot be reconnected using the unassigned boundary injection I 12 , as can be shown by a run of the algorithm in [30, Fig. 1 ]. Here, we note that I 12 is the only unassigned boundary injection in G correspond to H but with the removal of the rows corresponding to measurements in K and the addition of rows corresponding to measurements in K .
C. Observability Sets
Next, in Theorem 1, we show that the derived critical sets are indispensable for modeling observability attacks.
Theorem 1: For m ∈ M C , removing its critical set, C m , renders the system unobservable.
Proof: By topological observability, we know that a system is observable if and only if a spanning tree could be formed using an assignment function. When m is removed, the original spanning tree T is split into two disjoint trees T
cannot be connected using an assignment function, which implies that a spanning tree cannot be formed, implying that the system is not observable. As such, removing a critical set renders the power system unobservable.
Based on Theorem 1, the critical measurements 9 of a power system can be characterized using critical measurement sets, as shown in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: m is a critical measurement if and only if its critical set is C m = {m}. Proof: By definition, if m is a critical measurement, removing it will render the system unobservable. Hence, if the critical set of m is such that C m ⊃ m, then removing m would not affect the observabilty of the system since any other measurement m ∈ C m \ {m} can be used to replace m and reconnect the tree. As such, C m ⊃ {m} ⇒ m is not a critical measurement, which proves the contrapositive: m is critical ⇒ m is the only element in its critical set, i.e. {m} = C m . Conversely, if m is the only element in its critical set, its removal constitutes removing a complete critical set, which by Theorem 1 renders the system unobservable. As a result, C m = {m} ⇒ m is a critical measurement. Thus, m is critical if and only if C m = {m}. In addition, removing a full critical set decreases the rank of the Jacobian matrix by 1. This is shown in Theorem 2, which will be proven next. However, we first present the following preliminary lemma, which is essential for the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 1: Let m ∈ M be an injection measurement over a bus η that is assigned to a line l, f (m) = l. Then, replacing m by a hypothetical line flow measurement m over line l will not affect the rank of matrix H. In other words, let H (−m)+(m ) be the the Jacobian matrix with the removal of the row corresponding to measurement m and the addition of the row corresponding to the hypothetical measurement m , then rank(H) = rank(H (−m)+(m ) ). Proof: Since m is assigned, i.e. is part of the original spanning tree measurement assignment, removing it will split the original spanning tree into two subtrees T 9 In power systems, a critical measurement is a single measurement which when removed renders the system unobservable [15] . 
. In this respect,
Therefore, Theorem 2 shows the effect of the removal of a single critical set on the rank of the Jacobian matrix. Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 provide a necessary condition for observability of the power system under observability attacks. In fact, the contrapositive of Theorem 1 states that if a power system is fully observable, then the investigated observability attack (i.e. the removal of measurements) did not result in removing a full critical set. Next, we extend this concept to account for the interconnection between multiple critical sets.
In fact, for a measurement m to be in the critical set of a measurement m, i.e. m ∈ C m , the critical set of m , C m , must contain measurements other than m , i.e. C m ⊃ {m }. Otherwise, m would not be redundant. For example, consider injection measurements I 6 and I 9 . Removing I 6 and I 9 will render the system unobservable -even though I 6 and I 9 do not form a critical set -since C I6 = {I 6 , I 11 } and C I9 = {I 9 , I 11 }.
As such, if I 6 is removed, I 11 can be used to replace I 6 since I 11 ∈ C I6 . However, if I 9 is also removed, even though I 11 ∈ C I9 , I 11 cannot be used to replace I 9 since I 11 has already been used as a replacement to I 6 . Therefore, removing I 9 and I 6 does render the system unobservable. Indeed, rank(H −(I6)−(I9) ) = 12 < N − 1 = 13. This concept can be extended to the interconnection between multiple critical sets. For example, consider F 2 , I 1 , I 2 , and I 5 and their critical sets shown in Table I . We can see that F 2 , I 1 , and I 2 have critical sets sharing measurements I 4 , I 11 , and I 13 . Hence, if F 2 , I 1 , and I 2 are removed, I 4 , I 11 , and I 13 are assigned, one to each of these measurements, to preserve system observability and, hence, cannot be used as part of further critical sets in case further measurements are removed. Hence, since C I5 = {I 5 , I 11 , I 13 }, removing F 2 , I 1 , I 2 and I 5 will render the system unobservable, even though {F 2 , I 1 , I 2 , I 5 } is not a critical set.
In this respect, the concept of critical sets must be further developed to yield a general graph-theoretic concept of observability attacks. This development is provided as follows. We build a bipartite graph in which each left-side node represents one of the critical sets of the power system, and each right-side node represents one measurement of the system. An example of this bipartite graph is shown in Fig. 5 . In this respect, an edge is drawn between a critical set C i and a measurement j if j ∈ C i . We refer to this bipartite graph as the critical setssystem measurements bipartite graph. Based on this formulation, a general concept of observability is established in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3: If the system is observable, then the maximum matching over the critical sets -system measurements bipartite graph includes all critical sets.
Proof: We prove this theorem by proving its contrapositive which is the following: if the maximum matching does not include all critical sets, then the system is not observable.
The contrapositive can be proven as follows. If one critical set is not matched to any measurements, then this critical set cannot be used to connect two subgraphs of the system. Since these two subgraphs can only be connected by this critical set, then there is no measurement assignment which will connect these two subgraphs. As a result, a spanning tree cannot be formed, implying that the system is not observable.
This proves the contrapositive of this theorem and, hence, proves the theorem.
Theorem 3 can be used to fully characterize observability attacks as follows. An observability attack is one in which measurements are removed (i.e. nodes from the right-side of the critical sets -system measurements bipartite graph) such that the maximum matching over the bipartite graph does not include all critical sets (i.e. nodes on the left-side of the critical sets -system measurements bipartite graph), which renders the system unobservable. This, as a result, provides a general analytical characterization of observability attacks and enables an analytical prediction of the effect of the removal of a subset of measurements on the observability of the system. For example, such characterization allows analytical derivation of various security indices related to observability attacks such as finding the observability attack of lowest cardinality, or finding the minimal set of measurements to remove in addition to a certain measurement to make the system unobservable. This, as a result, provides analytical tools which are necessary to further assess the vulnerability of a system against observability attacks as well as derive defense strategies to thwart such attacks. Indeed, in what follows, we focus on stealthy data injection attacksproving that they are a subset of observability attacks -and show how our provided analytical characterization of observability attacks enables solutions of various widely-studied stealthy data injection attack problems. To this end, we introduce sets of measurements, dubbed observability sets, as follows, which are valuable for the analysis of data injection attacks which ensues.
Definition 5: An observability set S ∈ M, is a set of measurements such that strictly removing S leads the maximum matching over the critical sets -system measurements bipartite graph not to include a certain critical set.
The term "strictly" in this definition reflects that adding any measurement s ∈ S, which was removed, back to the right-side of the bipartite graph will result in reincluding the previously unmatched critical set in the maximum matching. A union of observability sets is, then, defined to be a set of measurements composed of a number of observability sets such that, when each of these sets is successively removed, each such removal leads to excluding one additional critical set from being part of the maximum matching over the critical sets -system measurements bipartite graph. Adding back any of the removed measurements to the right-side of the bipartite graph will result in reincluding one of the unmatched critical sets in the maximum matching. These observability sets play a crucial role in characterizing stealthy data injection attacks, as will be shown next.
We next introduce stealthy data injection attacks and prove that they are a variant of our introduced observability attacks. This enables further studying and solving various problems related to SDIAs using our developed analytical tools.
IV. STEALTHY DATA INJECTION ATTACKS

A. Stealthy Data Injection Attacks
Recalling the measurement-state equation in (1), data injection attacks aim at replacing the measurement vector, z by a manipulated measurement vector z a = z + a, where a ∈ R m is the attack vector, resulting in a new state estimatex a . However, typically, the state estimation process is run in conjunction with what is known as a bad data detector and identifier (BDD). The BDD aims at detecting and identifying the presence of outliers in the collected data set, so that such outliers can be removed preventing them from affecting the estimation outcome. Such BDDs rely on the statistical analysis of what is known as measurement residuals, r, defined as [15] :
where
and W = I n − S. A statistical analysis on the residuals enables analysis of the magnitudes of the errors associated with each measurement, and hence, allows the identification of outliers [15] . Regarding data injection attacks, when data is added to certain measurements, the adversary aims at keeping the residuals unchanged, so that the attack cannot be detected by the BDD. Indeed, as shown in [5] , an attack vector that falls in the column-space of the Jacobian matrix H, i.e. a = Hc, cannot be detected by residual statistical analysis. Indeed, for a = Hc,
As such, given the weighted least squares state estimation equation in (2), the attack vector a = Hc generates an arbitrary new state estimatex a =x + c by choosing the constant vector c without inducing any changes to the residual vector, as shown in (5) . Such DIAs are, hence, stealthy and are referred to as stealthy DIAs. The ability of SDIAs to stealthily manipulate the state estimates poses various challenges to the operation of the grid. Hence, understanding and modeling such attacks is indispensable to the secure and sustainable operation of power systems.
To this end, we next introduce a holistic graph-theoretic modeling of SDIAs that is based on the graph-theoretic modeling of observability attacks introduced in Section III.
B. Graph-Theoretic Modeling of SDIAs
The observability attacks and observability sets introduced in Section III provide the basis for a graph-theoretic interpretation of SDIAs as will be shown in Theorem 4. However, before introducing and proving Theorem 4, we introduce a preliminary lemma which will be used in the proof of Theorem 4.
Lemma 2: If a DIA is stealthy (i.e. a = Hc), then removing the attacked measurements renders the system unobservable.
Proof: Since the attack vector a is stealthy, then a = Hc. Since H is of full rank, then the only solution to Hc = 0 is c = 0. Hence, a = Hc has zero and nonzero elements for c = 0. Now, if all of the rows of H corresponding to nonzero elements of a are removed to form matrix H new , then, this results in a new = H new c = 0 for c = 0. Hence, H new is not of full rank and the power system whose Jacobian matrix is given by H new is unobservable. Therefore, when the attack is stealthy, removing the attacked measurements renders the system unobservable.
Here we note, that the result of Lemma 2, provides a one directional relation stating that if a = Hc, i.e. the attack is stealthy, then the removal of the nonzero elements of a, i.e. the attacked measurements, causes the system to be unobservable. However, the reverse direction does not always hold true. Indeed, the reverse statement of Lemma 2 states that, if removing a set of measurements renders the system unobservable, then this guarantees that a stealthy DIA can be constructed which targets all of these measurements, and only these measurements. We next provide a counter example which proves that this reverse statement does not hold true. In this regard, we consider the Jacobian matrix H to be represented as follows:
We let M 0 and M 1 represent the subset of measurements corresponding to the rows of H 0 and H 1 , respectively. Consider M 0 to contain one critical measurement, i.e., one row of H 0 is independent of all of the other rows of H. As such, removing the subset of measurements M 0 renders the system unobservable. In addition, consider two measurements m 0 ∈ M 0 and m 1 ∈ M 1 such as m 0 measures the power flow from bus i to bus j and m 1 measures the power flow from bus j to bus i (i.e., m 0 and m 1 are installed on the same transmission line but measure the flow in two opposite directions). In this regard, let h 0 and h 1 correspond to the rows of m 0 and m 1 in, respectively, H 0 and H 1 . Then, we have 10 h 0 = −h 1 . As a result, one cannot find a stealthy attack
, in which all the elements of a 0 are nonzero and all the elements of a 1 are zero, since if h 0 c = 0, then h 1 c = 0, due to the fact that h 0 = −h 1 . This implies that for the attack to target all the measurements in M 0 and be stealthy, this attack must also target measurements in M 1 . Otherwise, this attack must be limited to a strict subset of M 0 and may not target all the measurements in M 0 . As a result, even though removing the measurements in M 0 renders the system unobservable, one cannot necessarily construct a stealthy attack vector that only targets all the measurements in M 0 . Hence, this provides a counter example of the reverse statement of Lemma 2 proving that this reverse statement does not always hold true. Theorem 4: A DIA is stealthy if and only if the attacked measurements constitute a union of observability sets.
Proof: We begin by proving that when the attacked measurements (i.e. nonzero elements of the attack vector a) constitute a union of observability sets, then a is stealthy (i.e. a can be represented as a = Hc). As shown in Theorem 3, when an observability set (equivalently, a union of observability sets) is removed, the system is unobservable. Hence, consider an observability set S which has been removed. Let H (−S) be the system's Jacobian matrix without the measurements in S and let C be the critical set which cannot be part of a maximum matching over the critical sets -system measurements bipartite graph when S is removed. Since the system is unobservable when removing S, H (−S) y = 0 for a y = 0. However, the addition of any measurement s ∈ S will reinclude C in the maximum matching over the critical sets -system measurements bipartite graph, and hence, reconnect the tree. As such, let H (−S)+(k) correspond to H (−S) with the addition of a row corresponding to a measurement k ∈ S. In this regard, since the system is rendered observable, H (−S)+(k) is of full rank and H (−S)+(k) y will have one nonzero element corresponding to the row of H (−S)+(k) pertaining to the added measurement k. This procedure can be repeated for all k ∈ S. As such, adding the rows corresponding to S back to the Jacobian matrix results in b = Hy in which only the elements of b corresponding to measurements in S are nonzero. As a result, a = b is an attack vector in which only the observability set S is attacked and is proven to be stealthy. Now, we prove that, when an attack is stealthy, i.e. a = Hc, then the nonzero elements of a correspond to a union of observability sets. In this regard, from Lemma 2, we know that removing the nonzero elements of a = Hc will render the system unobservable, which implies that the nonzero elements of a contain at least one observability set. Let S denote this observability set, and let H (−S) be the system's Jacobian matrix without the measurements in S. Removing S will lead to two subsystems each of which is fully observable (i.e. it will split the spanning tree, T , into two subtrees each of which spans its own subgraph). Let H 1 and H 2 be the Jacobian matrices of each of these two subsystems (we denote these subsystems as subsystem 1 and subsystem 2) and let a 1 and a 2 correspond to the portions of a (excluding the measurements of the previously removed observability set) corresponding to the measurements in H 1 and H 2 , respectively. In addition, let c 1 and c 2 correspond to the portions of c pertaining to nodes in subsystem 1 and subsystem 2, respectively. Now, if a i for i ∈ {1, 2} has nonzero elements, this implies that removing these elements will make subsystem i unobservable, which implies that the nonzero elements of a i contain an observability set. Following this same logic, removing this observability set will subsequently split subsystem i into two subsystems, each of which is observable. This process can be continued recursively until no measurement m corresponding to a nonzero element of a remains. Hence, this shows that when a = Hc, then the nonzero elements of a correspond to a union of observability sets.
This proves both directions of the theorem, and hence, concludes the proof.
Theorem 4 provides an analytical graph-theoretic modeling of SDIAs using the fundamentals of observability attacks introduced in Section III. This enables a fundamental understanding of SDIAs since it allows the characterization of the subset of measurements which would be compromised as part of an SDIA and hence enables defense against such attacks. In addition, this analytical characterization of SDIAs enables a more in-depth analysis of such integrity attacks and allows a unified derivation of analytical solutions to a wide-range of well-studied problems in this field, as will be explored in Section IV-C.
Example 1: As an illustrative example of the result 11 in Theorem 4, we consider the IEEE 14-bus system, shown in Fig. 1 , whose line transmission data can be found in [34] . We consider the stealthy attack a = Hc with c = [1, 0, ..., 0]
T , which corresponds to having the attack vector equal to the first column of the Jacobian matrix H given by H(:, 1) = [−16.9, 0, 0, 0, −16.9, 33.37, −5.05, −5.67, −5.75, zeros (1, 8)] T . This attack consists of attacking measurement indices {1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} which correspond to {F 2 , I 1 , I 2 , I 3 , I 4 , I 5 }. In this respect, we next verify whether this attack is stealthy, following Theorem 4. To this end, Fig. 5 shows a portion of the critical sets -system measurements bipartite graph that is relevant to the attacked measurements. The post-attack portion of Fig. 5 marks the nodes corresponding to measurements {F 2 , I 1 , I 2 , I 3 , I 4 , I 5 }, on the right-side of the bipartite graph, as attacked (following the attack vector a). As a result, all the edges connecting these nodes to the critical sets on the left-side of the bipartite graph are removed. Then, building a maximum matching over the post-attack bipartite graph shows that, indeed, not all the critical sets are matched. Hence, the removed measurements lead to a maximum matching that does not include all critical sets. Furthermore, the addition of a node corresponding to any of the attacked measurements, i.e. {F 2 , I 1 , I 2 , I 3 , I 4 , I 5 }, would lead to reincluding one of 11 In this example, we index the measurements in Fig. 1 from  1 to 17 in an incremental manner based on the following order (F 2 , F 8 , F 9 , F 15 , I 1 , I 2 , I 3 , I 4 , I 5 , I 6 , I 7 , I 9 , I 11 , I 12 , I 13 , F 17 , F 19 Pre-attack Post-attack
. Critical sets -system measurements maximum matching and SDIAs.
the unmatched critical sets {C F2 , C I3 , C I5 } in the maximum matching. This implies that the attack consists of a union of observability sets which implies that the attack is, indeed, stealthy.
C. Unified Solution to Diverse SDIA Problems
Theorem 4 provides a basis for studying various SDIA problems from a graph-theoretic perspective. Indeed, this representation provides a unified approach for characterizing analytical solutions to various widely-studied SDIA problems. In this regard, we next present a set of such SDIA problems and show that the derivations leading to Theorem 4 enable the understanding and characterization of analytical solutions to these problems.
SDIA analyses can be categorized based on whether the focus is on modeling the attack or the defense strategies. As such, we first present two problems focusing on modeling attack strategies followed by two problems focusing on the derivation of defense strategies to thwart SDIAs.
1) Modeling SDIA Attack Strategies: Modeling SDIA attack strategies enables a vulnerability assessment of the system and allows anticipating sophisticated attack strategies which can target the system. This, in turn, allows the derivation of adequate defense strategies to thwart such attacks. As such, solving SDIA problems focusing on modeling the attack strategies is indispensable to understanding such attacks and, as a result, defending the system against them. We next focus on two problems which aim at modeling potential attack strategies. 
Problem 1 has been proposed in [20] and studied in [21] and [22] . However, the derived solution in [21] is based on an approximate relaxation method while the solution in [22] focuses on the special case assuming that the measurement set consists of all injection measurements at all buses and all line flow measurements at all transmission lines, which limits its generality. Instead, here, we provide a general analytical characterization of the solution to this problem using our developped graph-theoretic framework.
The solution to this problem enables a vulnerability assessment of each measurement against SDIAs since it shows, for each measurement, what is the minimum number of measurements which must be additionally compromised to potentially launch an SDIA against the system. This can represent a security index of that measurement following which, a measurement with a lower (higher) security index is more (less) vulnerable to SDIAs. In other words, a measurement which has a low security index is more easily targeted by SDIAs since the adversary would not need to comprise a large number of additional measurements to lunch the stealthy attack. Such knowledge can be used to improve the security of the system -by adding redundancy or adding security defense mechanisms (such a encryption techniques or advanced meetering uints) -at the meters which are deemed the most vulnerable to SDIAs.
The analytical graph-theoretic solution to Problem 1 is characterized in Theorem 5.
Theorem 5: The stealthy attack of smallest cardinality containing measurement k corresponds to attacking the measurements of the critical set of lowest cardinality which contains k.
Proof: First, we show that the attack containing the critical set of lowest cardinality containing k is, indeed, stealthy. Then, we prove that this attack corresponds to the stealthy attack containing k that has a minimum cardinality.
By Theorem 4, for the attack to be stealthy, the removal of the attacked measurements must lead the maximum matching over the critical sets -system measurements bipartite graph not to include all the critical sets (i.e. all the left-side nodes of the bipartite graph). In other words, the attack must be composed of a union of obseravbility sets. In this respect, removing the critical set containing k that is of smallest cardinality is, indeed, stealthy since removing a whole critical set will disconnect the node corresponding to this critical set (on the left-hand side of the critical sets -system measurements bipartite graph) from the right-side of the bipartite graph which prevents this critical measurement from being part of a maximum matching.
Next, we prove that there are no stealthy attacks containing k that have a smaller cardinality. In this regard, for an attack containing k to be stealthy, it must prevent a critical set, in which k exists, from being part of the maximum matching over the critical sets -system measurements bipartite graph. To this end, a critical set would be excluded from the maximum matching in two cases: 1) if all the measurements corresponding to this critical set are attacked, or 2) if all the measurements corresponding to this critical set are part of a different matching, which assigns these measurements to other critical sets.
In the first case, considering attacking all the measurements in a critical set, then attacking the critical set that has the fewest number of measurements -as stated in this theoremcorresponds to the minimum cardinality attack.
As for the second case, if a measurement k in a critical set containing k is matched -as part of a maximum matching -to another critical set (we denote this set by C p ), then measurement p must be attacked since, otherwise, C p would have been matched to p sparing k to be matched to another critical set to maximize the cardinality of the matching. In other words, matching a critical set C p with a measurement k = p while p is not attacked is contradictory to the assumption that this matching is maximum. As a result, for a critical set C, such that k ∈ C, to be discarded from the maximum matching, every measurement in C must be matched to another critical set. This implies that at least one measurement of each of these critical sets is attacked. Thus, the number of attacked measurements will be at least equal to the number of measurements within C for the attack to be stealthy. Consequently, the stealthy attack containing k that has the lowest cardinality corresponds to attacking only the measurements within the critical set containing k that has the lowest cardinality.
Solving Problem 1 will also facilitate solving another key SDIA problem, referred to as Problem 2, and stated as follows.
Problem 2: What is the SDIA with the lowest cardinality? In other words, which SDIA is a solution to: min a ||a|| 0 , subject to: a = Hc.
Similarly to Problem 1, the solution to Problem 2 also provides a vulnerability assessment of the system against SDIAs. In fact, Problem 1 focuses on finding the security index associated with each measurement. On the other hand, Problem 2 focuses on the system as a whole by focusing on finding, in general, the sparsest data injection attack which can target the system and be stealthy. This corresponds to a security index for the whole system. Indeed, this security index reflects the amount of effort that an attacker must put to potentially launch an SDIAs against the system. A low security index shows that, even when manipulating a small set of measurements, the attack can be stealthy. In contrast, a high security index reflects the robustness of the system against SDIAs since the attacker would need to concurrently manipulate a large number of measurements to potentially launch a successful SDIA.
The solution to Problem 2 is provided in Proposition 1. Proposition 1: The stealthy attack with the lowest cardinality corresponds to attacking the smallest critical set.
Proof: This proof follows directly from the proof of Theorem 5. Indeed, since the stealthy attack containing measurement k that is of smallest cardinality corresponds to the critical set of lowest cardinality containing k, then searching for the global stealthy attack of lowest cardinality should be limited to only critical sets. Based on this fact, the stealthy attack of lowest cardinality is the one in which the measurements in the critical set of lowest cardinality are the only measurements that are attacked (the only measurements having nonzero corresponding elements in the attack vector a).
Example 2: For example, by inspecting the critical sets in Table I , we can solve Problem 1 and Problem 2 for the IEEE 14-bus system shown in Fig. 1 . With regard to Problem 1, the results of Theorem 5 can be readily applied to find the minimum stealthy attack containing a certain measurement k. For example, the minimum stealthy attack containing measurement I 4 corresponds to attacking C I3 = {I 3 , I 2 , I 4 }, since that is the critical set of smallest cardinality containing I 4 . As for Problem 2, the stealthy attack of lowest cardinality is one in which either C F15 = {F 15 , I 7 }, C I6 = {I 6 , I 11 }, or C I9 = {I 9 , I 11 } are attacked. As such, the minimum possible cardinality of a stealthy attack for this IEEE 14-bus system is 2. To find such a stealthy attack, the basis of the null space can be found for matrices
. We refer to these vectors as n F15 , n I6 , and n I9 , respectively. As a result, these stealthy attack vectors of minimum cardinality can be obtained as αHn F15 , αHn I6 , or αHn I9 , where α is a scalar multiplier. 2) Modeling SDIA Defense Strategies: The knowledge acquired from our introduced graph-theoretic framework enables the derivation of adequate defense policies which can thwart potential SDIAs. In this regard, next, two fundamental widelystudied problems for defending the system against SDIAs are presented and investigated in Problem 3 and Problem 4.
Problem 3: What is the minimum set of measurements that need to be protected (i.e. made immune to SDIAs) to guarantee no SDIAs can be successful?
The solution to this problem enables finding a minimum-cost defense strategy to thwart all potential SDIAs. Hence, this makes the system robust against all possible SDIAs. However, even though the solution to this problem provides the minimum-cost defense strategy (assuming that protecting each measurement is equally costly), for a practically large power system with several thousand buses, such a defense strategy is likely to exceed any practical security budget.
The solution to Problem 3 is presented in Theorem 6. Theorem 6: The minimum set of measurements that must be protected to guarantee that no SDIAs can be successful corresponds to protecting all measurements in M C , i.e. all measurements that are part of the original assignment function forming the spanning tree over the power system.
Proof: By Theorem 4, for an attack to be stealthy, it must lead to a critical set not to be matched as part of a maximum matching over the critical sets -system measurements bipartite graph. Hence, to guarantee that no attack can be stealthy, all critical sets must be guaranteed to be matched. Thus, the minimum number of measurements to be protected must be at least equal to the number of critical sets, which is equal to the number of measurements in M C . In this regard, protecting every measurement m ∈ M C results in protecting the minimum possible number of measurements which guarantees that C m can be matched to m for all m ∈ M C , hence, guaranteeing that no stealthy attack can be successfully carried out.
This proof can also be carried out equivalently using the techniques of linear algebra. Indeed, protecting all the measurements in M C will guarantee that these measurements will be part of the Jacobian matrix H. Since these measurements form a spanning tree over the power system, their rows in H are linearly independent. As such, let H C be the Jacobian matrix corresponding only to measurements in M C , then H C c = 0 has no solution other than c = 0. The rows of H C are a subset of the rows of H. As such, one cannot find an attack vector a = Hc such that all the elements of a corresponding to the rows of H C are zero. Hence, one cannot find a stealthy attack a = Hc which does not attack the measurements in M C . As a result, protecting these measurements will guarantee that no stealthy attack can be carried out.
Here, the minimum defense set, solution to Problem 3, might not be unique. In other words, the set M C might not be the only minimum set of measurements which, when defended, makes the system immune to SDIAs. However, characterizing a solution to this problem provides important information regarding the size of investments needed to make a power system immune to SDIAs. In this regard, regardless of how high the number of measurements in an N -bus system is, the number of measurements that must be protected to render the system immune to SDIAs is always equal to N − 1. As such, by assessing the costs of reinforcing the security of each measurement unit, the solution to Problem 3 enables the calculation of the cost needed to make the system robust against SDIAs. However, as the solution implies, for practical power systems, securing this number of measurements might exceed practical budget constraints.
Example 3: Applying the results in Theorem 6 to our treated IEEE 14-bus system case analysis, protecting the measurements in the first column of Table I is the set of measurements of minimal cardinality which when protected renders the IEEE 14-bus system in Fig. 1 immune to SDIAs.
Theorem 4 and the solutions to Problem 1, Problem 2, and Problem 3 can be used to solve Problem 4 which was proposed in [23] and which is presented next. The solution to Problem 4 in [23] was derived based on an l 1 relaxation of the corresponding optimization problem which leads to approximate, rather than generally accurate solutions.
Problem 4: What is the minimum set of measurements to protect as to force the attacker to manipulate at least τ a measurements to stay stealthy?
As discussed in Problem 3, making the system completely robust against SDIAs may be very costly and exceed any practical budgetary constraints. As a result, rather than considering all theoretically possible SDIAs, the solution to Problem 4 focuses on defending the system against a large subset of practical SDIAs in which the attacker's limited resources prevents its attack vector's cardinality from exceeding τ a . In other words, an attacker might not be able to concurrently comprise more than τ a measurement units. This, hence, enables defending the system against a practically large subset of potential SDIAs. In addition, the solution to this problem allows using the knowledge about the resources of potential attackers -which can be potentially acquired from historical data -to compute adequate defense policies against such attacks.
The solution to Problem 4 is presented in Proposition 2. Proposition 2: A minimum set of measurements to protect so that no attack with cardinality ||a|| 0 < τ a can be stealthy, corresponds to protecting one distinct measurement from each critical set whose cardinality is less than τ a .
Proof: Solving Problem 4 entails ensuring that all critical sets of cardinality smaller than τ a are part of the maximum matching. Hence, when one distinct measurement in each of these sets is secured, it is ensured that these critical sets will be part of the maximum matching over the critical setssystem measurements bipartite graph. As a result, additional measurements would need to be attacked to target critical sets of higher cardinality, if a stealthy attack were to be found, which would require the attacker to manipulate more than τ a measurements. Hence, the solution to Problem 4 is a direct result of Theorem 6 but by considering critical sets that have cardinality smaller than τ a rather than all critical sets, as is the case in Theorem 6. As such, the rest of the proof of Proposition 2 follows directly from the proof of Theorem 6. This result is very important since it allows the defender to build on some knowledge that it has about the capacity and resources of the attacker, to build a corresponding defense policy. In other words, knowing that the attacker does not have the capacity to concurrently manipulate more than τ a measurements enables the defender to focus on defending a smaller set of measurements rather than aiming to thwart any theoretically possible SDIA. This can lead to a significant reduction in the needed resources for such a defense since, as shown in the solution of Problem 3, the latter defense policy requires committing a large volume of resources which can exceed practical constraints.
Example 4: For our studied IEEE 14-bus system, consider that τ a = 3. This indicates that a set of measurements to protect must be found to ensure that no attacker can have a successful stealthy attack by attacking less than 3 measurements. The critical sets that have cardinality lower than 3 are C F15 , C I6 , and C I9 which all have a cardinality of 2. Now, we consider a distinct measurement in each of these three sets, such that I 7 , I 6 , and I 9 . As a result, {I 7 , I 6 , I 9 } is a minimum set of measurements which, when defended, no stealthy attack vector of cardinality less than τ a = 3 can be successfully launched.
As such, showing that SDIAs are a subset of our introduced observability attacks, enables using our proposed graphtheoretic framework to model, understand, and thwart such types of cyber-physical attacks. Indeed, the four problems that we have discussed show the way our developed framework enables analytical characterization of the solutions to these various wellstudied SIDA problems. Such analytical characterization allows assessing the vulnerability of the system against SDIAs as well as deriving adequate defense strategies.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE OUTLOOK
In this paper, we have introduced a novel graph-theoretic framework which enables a fundamental modeling of observability attacks targeting power systems and have proven that the widely-studied stealthy data injection attacks are a special case of such observability attacks. Based on this proposed framework, we have characterized the analytical solutions to various central observability and data injection attack problems. These solutions aim at capturing potential attack strategies as well as suggesting defense policies to thwart such attacks. In this respect, we have shown that our derived framework enables characterization of the sparsest stealthy attack as well as the sparsest stealthy attack including a certain measurement. With respect to defense policies, we have shown that our graphtheoretic framework enables the analytical characterization of the minimum measurement set which when defended guarantees thwarting any potential stealthy attack as well as the minimum set of measurements whose defense guarantees that no attack below a certain cardinality can be stealthy.
The proposed graph-theoretic framework provides a general analytical tool using which a wide set of key observability attacks and data injection attacks problems can be modeled and analyzed, and is not limited to the set of problem examples which are studied in this paper. For example, the problem of characterizing the sparsest stealthy attack containing a certain measurement can be extended to studying the sparsest stealthy attack containing a certain set of measurements. Using our proposed framework, a solution approach can be investigated to potentially derive analytical solutions to this critical problem. The solution of this problem enables a risk assessment of the power system by quantifying the risk of having a vulnerable set of measurements and the way that such a vulnerability can be leveraged by an intelligent malicious attacker. Along the same lines, for security assessment, a central problem is quantifying the sparsest stealthy attack possible when a certain set of measurements is defended. The solution to this problem enables assessment of the effectiveness and impact of an implemented defense strategy. This problem has been formalized in [23] . However, the proposed solution approach in [23] relied on an l 1 relaxation of the original optimization problem formulation which leads to approximate numerical solutions. However, our introduced graph-theoretic framework can be used to attempt the characterization of analytical solutions to this problem.
Beyond these one-sided attack and defense problems, the ability to analytically characterize attack and defense policies using the proposed framework allows studying problems that involve interactions between attackers and defenders from a game-theoretic perspective. Such analyses can account for the opponent's potential attack or defense strategies when designing, respectively, defense policies or attack vectors. As a result, such analyses allow the modeling and investigation of practical competitive attack vs. defense settings. This enables studying the effects of sophisticated observability attacks and data injection attacks on the system as well as the impact of proposed defense strategies within various application domains such as electricity markets, congestion management, and contingency analysis, among others, thus taking the application of our framework beyond the domain of power systems which motivated this study.
